zotero vs endnote for american antiquity

Moorean arguments can be used against nihilists in ethics (. They take, as a premise, a highly plausible first-order claim (e.g., cars move, I ate breakfast before lunch, it’s true that some fish have gills) and conclude from it the falsity of the highly revisionary philosophical thesis. Moorean arguments are a popular and powerful way to engage highly revisionary philosophical views, such as nihilism about motion, time, truth, consciousness, causation, and various kinds of skepticism (e.g., external world, other minds, inductive, global).

On the contrary, as I argue, dogmatism predicts that Moorean reasoning suffers from a clearly identifiable defect.

As I argue, however, this does not provide grounds for an argument against dogmatism, because - contrary to what many philosophers have thought - dogmatism need not license Moorean reasoning. Nevertheless, Moorean reasoning does seem intuitively defective. To begin with, I argue that the common assumption that uncontroversial Bayesian principles suffice to show that Moorean reasoning is not cogent is false: for all that Bayesianism says on the matter, Moorean reasoning might be perfectly fine. In this paper I defend dogmatism against this line of thought.

Despite its intuitive attractions, many philosophers have argued that dogmatism goes wrong because they have thought that it licenses Moorean reasoning - i.e., reasoning in which one uses the conclusion of an inference as a premise in an argument against a skeptical hypothesis that (. According to dogmatism, one may know a proposition by inferring it from a set of evidence even if one has no independent grounds for rejecting a skeptical hypothesis compatible with one’s evidence but incompatible with one’s conclusion.

Zotero vs endnote for american antiquity